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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.  CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.  WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS
COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).   A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY
PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held
at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New
York, on the 29th day of May, two thousand thirteen.
PRESENT:
RALPH K. WINTER,
PETER W. HALL,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
Circuit Judges. 
_________________________________________
Austin Obodai, an individual and d/b/a HEPTAD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,              
  v. 12-2450
 
Cracked Entertainment Inc., (Cracked.com), a
specific humor site,
Defendant,
Demand Media Inc., a Delaware Corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________
FOR APPELLANT: Austin Obodai, pro se, Bronx, NY.
FOR APPELLEE: William C. Silverman, Ian C. Ballon, and Wendy M. Mantell,
Greenberg Traurig, LLP, New York, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Castel, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Appellant Austin Obodai, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of Demand Media Inc. (“Demand Media”), dismissing his
copyright infringement action, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 501.  We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history of the case, and issues on appeal.
We review orders granting summary judgment de novo and focus on whether the
district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Miller v. Wolpoff &
Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003).  In determining whether there are
genuine issues of material fact, we are “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all
permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is
sought.”  Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted).  Summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole could
not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.”  Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Upon conducting such a review, we conclude that Obodai’s appeal is without merit
substantially for the reasons articulated by the district court in its well-reasoned summary
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judgment decision.  See Obodai v. Demand Media Inc., No. 11-cv-2503, 2012 WL
2189740 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2012).  In short, the district court correctly determined that
Demand Media was eligible for the User Storage Safe Harbor under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512, because the undisputed evidence established that Demand
Media satisfied the requirements under § 512(c) and (i).  The record does not support
Obodai’s assertion that Demand Media’s use of the software tool “Tynt” required the
district court to reach a different result. 
We have considered Obodai’s remaining arguments and find them to be without
merit.  The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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